Iranian Threat

Iran’s refusal to halt its uranium enrichment drive, despite the sanctions that have been imposed on it, has encouraged hawks for Israel to press for military strikes against Tehran. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s remarks at the United Nations General Assembly that the state of Israel is in terminal decline, and that the eclipse of the American empire is on the horizon, have further infuriated pro-war lobbies in both countries.

In Israel, the former military chief, Moshe Yaalon, remarked that an Israeli armed confrontation with Iran had become inevitable. He said: “Today, we in the West are facing the same situation, the lack of decisiveness toward a threat no less severe than that which posed in 1939.”

Observations made by Israeli military intelligence sources have added to a sense of urgency in Israeli ruling circles with respect to dealing with Iran. In a recent Cabinet briefing, Israeli military intelligence official observed that the sanctions have very little influence, and are far from bringing to bear a critical mass of pressure on Iran. Iran is developing a command of uranium-enrichment technology and is galloping toward a nuclear bomb.

The statement made on September 22 by Mohamed ElBaradei, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, that the IAEA had not made “substantive progress” in clarifying the “possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme,” has encouraged those who see air strikes as the only way to curb Tehran’s presumed drive towards atomic weapons.

Notwithstanding an aggressive campaign to shape public opinion in favour of an attack, there has been a major shift in the political circumstances that the advocates of war now encounter. Russia’s military assertion in Georgia and a show of strength in parts of West Asia, combined with domestic political and economic preoccupations in Washington, appear to have forestalled the chances of an immediate strike against Iran.

Following Russia’s movement into South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev acknowledged that Moscow was aware that serious plans to attack Iran had been laid out. “We know that certain players are planning an attack against Iran. But we oppose any unilateral step and a military solution to the nuclear crisis,” he said at the Valdai Discussion Club, an annual forum of opinion-makers in Moscow.

Russia’s confrontation with Georgia appeared to be partly responsible for Moscow’s perception that an attack on Iran was in the works. It is now acknowledged that Russia seized control of two airfields in Georgia from where air strikes against Iran were being planned. The Russian forces also apparently recovered weapons and Israeli spy drones that would have been useful for the surveillance of possible Iranian targets. A strike on Iran from Georgian soil would have been easier: planes could fly into Iran after crossing the Caspian Sea. Otherwise, Israeli aircraft would have to take off from home soil. In that case, sorties would involve a much greater distance.

Besides, this would entail seeking permission from Jordan and Iraq for an air corridor — an objective that would be harder to achieve. In mid-September, Dmitry Rogozin, Russia’s envoy to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, said Russia had received intelligence that indicated that Washington also had plans to use Georgian military infrastructure for a war on Iran.

Russia’s involvement in Georgia has therefore greatly strengthened Iran’s hand. Even prior to the conflict in the Caucuses, Russia had promised Iran 29 Tor M-1 anti-aircraft missiles. These weapons, since deployed, were meant to protect Iran’s nuclear installations. But more important, the possible delivery to Iran of the highly capable S-300 missiles is now a favourite topic of discussions in Ministries and Chanceries in the region and beyond. The S-300, which can be used to down both aircraft and ballistic missiles, has been described by some experts as a “game changer” in the region. It can track 100 targets simultaneously at a distance of around 120 km. Not surprisingly, the Israelis have held a massive air exercise in Greece, which has purchased S-300 missiles from Russia. One of the objectives of the exercise was apparently for Israel to familiarise themselves with this weapon and try out effective countermeasures to neutralise it.

The Russians have hinted that they do not have any immediate plans to deliver these missiles, but the possibility of transferring them to Iran at some later point has been left open-ended. Mr. Mededev’s adviser, Oleg Tsatsurin, in remarks quoted saying: “Russia would not take any action that would change the balance of power in the Middle East or harm the excellent relations between Russia and Israel.” Notwithstanding these verbal assurances, the possibility of S-300 exports to Iran provides Moscow with a powerful means of leverage to enforce its will. What Russia wants is international acceptance of its actions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as an acknowledgement of its re-emergence as a major player in West Asia.

Russia’s military tie-up with Syria, at Israel’s doorstep, is also unlikely to go down well in Israeli military circles. The visit to Moscow of Syrian President Bashar Al Assad in August apparently resulted in an agreement that allows Russia to establish a naval base at Syria’s Mediterranean port of Tartus.Ten Russian warships are reportedly positioned at Tartus. Rear Admiral Andrei Baranov, the chief of Russian’s Black Sea Fleet, has said that Russian engineers were expanding the capacity of the harbour in Tartus to accommodate more ships. Besides, Russian teams were increasing capacity at Syria’s Latakia port.The Russian military presence in Syria, a key ally of Iran, is likely to discourage a military strike against Damascus and Tehran. Russia is therefore in the process of providing sufficient deterrence in an arc covering West Asia’s Mediterranean coastline to an area north of the Persian Gulf.

Diplomatically, Moscow has exerted itself by undermining American efforts to impose fresh sanctions against Iran. The six Foreign Ministers of countries that are represented in the Security Council and Germany who met in New York on September 27 failed to agree on the imposition of fresh sanctions against Iran. The Russians and the Chinese were the key players who successfully opposed any new curbs on Tehran.

Iranian retaliation, which will inevitably follow an attack, will trigger an unprecedented surge in oil prices — a scenario that would be unwelcome, especially as the U.S. economy is already in the doldrums.

While a decision on launching a war has apparently been kept on hold, it is entirely possible that it could be waged at a later date. Only a fundamental shift in position, by either Tehran or Washington, can defuse the crisis. Consequently, a military build-up around Iran, which is necessary to prosecute a war, is unlikely to be scaled down in a significant manner anytime soon.

While heavy force deployments around Iran have been reinforced by the Bush administration, a new development that needs further evaluation has surfaced. Apart from amassing military hardware, the Americans have begun to take tentative steps towards positioning diplomatic assets in Iran. The U.S. Treasury Department in late- September permitted the American-Iranian Council, a private organisation, to open an office in Tehran. The Council hopes to encourage academic exchanges between Iranian and American scholars, and later promote exchanges between law-makers. An idea of opening a U.S. Interests Section — a scaled-down embassy — in Tehran has been floated, though a final decision has been deferred for the new administration.

The Americans have also shown enthusiasm for a face-to-face nuclear dialogue with Iran. This was apparent in the presence of top U.S. diplomat William Burns in the last round of talks with Iran that were led by European Union foreign policy chief Javier Solana.A diplomatic presence in Tehran will provide Washington with the flexibility of pursuing both options — of going ahead with war during the tenure of this President, if the situation deteriorates, or rapidly moving on the reconciliation track through negotiations.

If Israel chose to take military action against Iran's nuclear facilities, it might opt not to send IAF jets on a mission but rather use its arsenal of medium-range ballistic missiles. The Jericho III, Israel's most advanced version of its custom-designed ballistic missile, is capable of carrying a 1,000-1,300 kilogram conventional payload or a 750kg nuclear warhead over a distance of up to 7,000 kilometers. With a smaller 350kg nuclear warhead, the missle's range can be extended even further.

According to the NCIS report, 42 missiles would be enough to "severely damage or demolish" Iran's core nuclear sites at Natanz, Esfahan and Arak. If the Jericho III is fully developed and its accuracy is quite high then this scenario could look much more feasible than using combat aircraft. It is predicted that a Jericho salvo on Iran might draw an Iranian counter-attack with its own Shihab ballistic missiles. The Islamic republic might also take action against Europe and other countries, by choking off oil exports, hitting US assets in the Gulf, or ordering proxy groups like Hizbullah to attack Jewish targets outside Israel

These are the main considerations that should determine whether or not to attack:
Would nuclear weapons in Iranian hands really constitute a clear and present danger to the existence of Israel?

Does Israel have the intelligence and operational capability to enable it to strike hard at Iran's nuclear sites?
What damage would be caused to Israel by an Iranian response?
Would an Israeli attack harm vital U.S. interests?
How would the Arab world react to such an attack?

Although Iran has crossed the "technological threshold" and already has most of the know-how, the equipment and the materials to enable it to create a nuclear bomb, it will take anther year at least and maybe even three, to implement the potential and the capability it has accumulated . It is not certain that nuclear bombs in Iranian hands would necessarily constitute an existential threat to Israel. The Gulf States, such as Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, should be more afraid than Israel, and in fact they are extremely worried. It is also difficult to imagine that the ayatollahs would use nuclear weapons. Such a use would not only eradicate the nation being attacked, it would also destroy the regime of the religious leaders as well as the lives of millions of people in Iran. But Israel will still have difficulty trusting in the rationalism of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad or Ayatollah Ali Khomanei.

Israel has the military ability to cause serious damage to the Iranian nuclear program, to hit the nerve centres of production: the uranium enrichment facility in Natanz, the uranium conversion facility in Isfahan and several additional sites where they are working on assembling the bomb. Such as attack would delay Iran's nuclear capability by several years, but would not destroy it entirely.

Iran has about 100 missiles that can reach Israel, and would also activate Hezbollah and its terror networks worldwide. But in spite of its technological achievements, Iran is a backward country, burdened with the problems of prostitution, drugs, poverty, ignorance and above all, corruption. It is doubtful whether a country that is riddled with rot is capable of maintaining a strong and efficient army. Iran is a paper tiger.An attack that is not coordinated with Washington would cause a deep rift with the United States and lead to the imposition of harsh sanctions.

Israel's special status in the United States stems not only from common cultural values and the Christian belief in the Holy Land and from the memory of the horrors of the Holocaust, but also, and primarily, from Israel's image as the lone ranger who fights the bad guys in the Wild West of the Middle East, in order to defend its existence. Recently there have been cracks in this image due to what are seen as Israel's failures in the most recent campaigns against Hezbollah and Hamas. In Samuels' opinion, Israeli weakness is undermining strategic cooperation with the United States, while Iran is trying to achieve regional hegemony.

In order to implement a strategic breakthrough, the Israeli government will have to orchestrate a formative historic event. In such a case, not only would the United States and the pro-Western Sunni Arab world accept the attack on their Shi'ite rival, they would even welcome it, thus making it possible to pave the way to more peace agreements with Arab nations, security arrangements a strategic alliance based on common interests.

A military strike by Israel against Iranian nuclear facilities is possible ... [but] would be complex and high-risk and would lack any assurances that the overall mission will have a high success rate.

It is not known whether Iran has some secret facilities where it is conducting uranium enrichment, there few more nuclear sites underground and the official mentioned nuclear does not stand to what is happening in the country. If facilities unknown to Western intelligence agencies do exist, Iran's uranium-enrichment programme could continue to develop in secret there, while Israel attacks the known sites and the strike's gains would thus be lost. In general, attacking Iran is justified only if it will put an end to Iran's nuclear programme or halt it for several years. That objective is very difficult to attain. Tehran is testing Sajji 2 or 3 with a range of 2000 kms that could attain the Eastern Europe and Israel.

Intelligence agencies are also divided on the critical question of when Iran will deliver a nuclear weapon. We need to maintain that Iran will have the bomb between 2009 and 2012, the U.S. intelligence community estimates it will not happen before 2013. If the Israeli intelligence assessment is accurate, the window for a military strike is rapidly closing. It is clear to everyone that no one will dare attack Iran once it possesses nuclear weapons.

Since Iran has dozens of nuclear facilities dispersed throughout its large territory, and since it is impossible to attack all of them. The option of hitting only three, which "constitute the core of the nuclear fuel cycle that Iran needs to produce nuclear weapons grade fissile material would be wise.

Destroying these three sites ought to stall the Iranian nuclear programme for several years. The three are: the nuclear research centre in Isfahan, the uranium-enrichment facility in Natanz, and the heavy water plant, intended for future plutonium production, in Arak. It is doubtful whether Israel would embark on an offensive with such major ramifications just to strike a small number of facilities, when it is not at all clear that this will stop Iran's nuclearisation for a significant length of time.

Three possible flights routes are optimal and most likely one is the northern one that passes along the Syria-Turkey border, cuts across the north-eastern edge of Iraq and leads into Iran. The central route passes over Jordan and is shorter, but should not be chosen for fear of political trouble with the Jordanians, if there is an underground by Jordanian King, it would facilitate very much. Using the southern route, which passes over Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, might likewise lead to political entanglements.

To prevent the aircraft being detected en route to Iran, the IAF would have to use advanced technology to invade and scramble communication networks and radar devices in the countries over which the F-15s and F-16s fly, so even though dozens of planes would pass through the countries' airspace, they will not be detected. The IAF used this technology in the raid on the Syrian nuclear reactor in Dayr az-Zawr, in September 2007. A hacker system was installed on two Gulfstream G550 aircraft that the IAF bought in recent years.

A strike mission on the three nuclear facilities would require no fewer than 90 combat aircraft, including all 25 F-15Es in the IAF inventory and another 65 F-16I/Cs. On top of that, all the IAF's refuelling planes will have to be airborne: 5 KC-130Hs and 4 B-707s. The combat aircraft will have to be refuelled both en route to and on the way back from Iran. The IAF will have a hard time locating an area above which the tankers can cruise without being detected by the Syrians or the Turks.

One of the toughest operational problems to resolve is the fact that the facility at Natanz is buried deep underground. Part of it, the fuel-enrichment plant, reaches a depth of 8 meters, and is protected by a 2.5-meter-thick concrete wall, which is in turn protected by another concrete wall. By mid-2004 the Iranians had fortified their defense of the other part of the facility, where the centrifuges are housed. They buried it 25 meters underground and built a roof over it made of reinforced concrete several meters thick.

The Iranians use the centrifuges to enrich uranium, which is required in order to produce a nuclear bomb. There are already 6,000 centrifuges at the Natanz facility; the Iranians plan to install a total of 50,000, which could be used to produce 500 kilos of weapons-grade uranium annually. Building a nuclear bomb takes 15-20 kilograms of enriched uranium. That means that the Natanz facility will be able to supply enough fissile material for 25-30 nuclear weapons per year.

Because the Natanz facility is so important, the Iranians have gone to great lengths to protect it. To contend with the serious defensive measures they have taken, the IAF will use two types of U.S.-made smart bombs nicknamed "bunker busters". One is called GBU-27, it weighs about 900 kilos and it can penetrate a 2.4-meter layer of concrete. The other is called GBU-28 and weighs 2,268 kilos; this monster can penetrate 6 meters of concrete and another layer of earth 30 meters deep. But for these bombs to penetrate ultra-protected Iranian facilities, IAF pilots will have to strike the targets with absolute accuracy and at an optimal angle.

But the challenges facing the IAF do not end there. Iran has built a dense aerial-defense system that will make it hard for Israeli planes to reach their targets unscathed. Among other things, the Iranians have deployed batteries of Hawk, SA-5 and SA-2 surface-to-air missiles, plus they have SA-7, SA-15, Rapier, Crotale and Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. Furthermore, 1,700 anti-aircraft guns protect the nuclear facilities - not to mention the 158 combat aircraft that might take part in defending Iran's skies. Most of those planes are outdated, but they may be scrambled to intercept the IAF, which will thus have to use part of its strike force to deal with the situation.

If Israel also decides to attack the famous reactor in Bushehr, an ecological disaster and mass deaths will result. The contamination released into the air in the form of radionuclides would spread over a large area, and thousands of Iranians who live nearby would be killed immediately; in addition, possibly hundreds of thousands would subsequently die of cancer. Because northerly winds blow in the area throughout most of the year, "most definitely Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE will be heavily affected by the radionuclides."

The difficulty involved in an IAF strike would become a moot point if ballistic missiles wind up being used instead of combat aircraft. The Iranians cannot defend against ballistic missiles. Jericho I, II and III. The Jericho I have a 500-kilometre range, a 450-kilogramme warhead, and can carry a 20-kiloton nuclear weapon. Jericho II has a 1,500-kilometer range, and entered service in 1990. It can carry a 1-megaton nuclear warhead. Jericho III is an intercontinental ballistic missile with a range of 4,800-6,500 kilometres, and can carry a multi-megaton nuclear warhead. The study says the latter was expected to enter service in 2008.

By calculation it will take 42 Jericho III missiles to destroy the three Iranian facilities, assuming that they all hit their marks, which is extremely difficult. It is not enough to hit the target area: To destroy the facilities it is necessary to hit certain points of only a few meters in size. It is doubtful the Jerichos' accuracy can be relied on, and that all of them will hit those critical spots with precision.

It is also to analyse the possible Iranian response to an Israeli strike. In all likelihood the result would be to spur Iranians to continue and even accelerate their nuclear programme, to create reliable deterrence in the face of an aggressive Israel. Iran would also withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which until now has enabled its nuclear programme to be monitored, to a certain degree, through inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency. An Israeli strike would immediately put a stop to the international community's attempts to pressure Iran into suspending development of nuclear weapons. The Obama Hussein administration is very naïve in regards to the Iranian threat.

Iran would also, almost certainly, retaliate against Israel directly. It might attack targets here with Shahab-3 ballistic missiles, whose range covers all of Israel. A few might even be equipped with chemical warheads. In addition, the Iranians would use Hezbollah and Hamas to dispatch waves of suicide bombers into Israel. The Second Lebanon War showed us Hezbollah's rocket capability, and the experience of the past eight years has been instructive regarding Hamas' ability to fire Qassams from the Gaza Strip.

Hezbollah launched 4,000 rockets from South Lebanon during the Second Lebanon War, and their effect on northern Israel has not been forgotten: Life was nearly paralysed for a whole month. Since then the Lebanese organisation's stockpile was replenished and enhanced, and it now has some 40,000 rockets. Israel does not have a response to those rockets. The rocket defence systems now being developed (Iron Dome and Magic Wand) are still far from completion, and even after they become operational, it is doubtful they will prove effective against thousands of rockets launched at Israel.

An Israeli strike on Iran would also sow instability in the Middle East. The Iranians would make use of the Shi'ites in Iraq, support Taliban fighters and improve their combat capabilities in Afghanistan. They also might attack American interests in the region, especially in countries that host U.S. military forces, such as Qatar and Bahrain. The Iranians would probably also attempt to disrupt the flow of oil to the West from the Persian Gulf region. Since the United States would be perceived as having given Israel a green light to attack Iran, American relations with allies in the Arab world could suffer greatly, however, that Iran's ally Syria would refrain from intervening if Israel strikes Iran's nuclear facilities.

Regarding a possible time frame for an Israeli strike. By 2010 Iran could pose a serious threat to its neighbours and Israel, because it would have enough nuclear weapons to deter the latter and the United States from attacking it. Iran's inventory of effective ballistic missiles capable of carrying nonconventional warheads could also be an incentive. The fear that the country will procure the Russian S-300V aerial-defense system (if it has not done so already) might also serve as an incentive for a pre-emptive strike. An IAF strike on Iran would be complicated and problematic, and that the chance of it succeeding is not great. That they must weigh all of the far-reaching ramifications that an Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities would have, and that they must not be fooled by promises, should any be made, by Israel Defense Forces officers who present the attack plan as having good odds for success.

One of the conclusions is that it is questionable whether Israel has the military capability to destroy Iran's nuclear programme, or even to delay it for several years. Therefore, if the diplomatic contacts the Obama administration is initiating with Iran prove useless, and if in the wake of their expected failure the American president does not decide to attack Iran, it is likely that Iran will possess nuclear weapons in a relatively short time. It seems, therefore, that policy makers in Jerusalem should begin preparing, mentally and operationally, for a situation in which Iran is a nuclear power with a strike capability against Israel.

This is the place to emphasize Israel's mistake in hyping the Iranian threat. The regime in Tehran is certainly a bitter and inflexible rival, but from there it's a long way to presenting it as a truly existential threat to Israel. Iran's involvement in terror in our region is troubling, but a distinction must be made between a willingness to bankroll terrorists, and an intention to launch nuclear missiles against Israel. Even if Iran gets nuclear weapons, Israel's power of deterrence will suffice to dissuade any Iranian ruler from even contemplating launching nuclear weapons against it.

It is time to stop waving around the scarecrow of an existential threat and refrain from making belligerent statements, which sometimes create a dangerous dynamic of escalation. And if the statements are superfluous and harmful - then this is doubly true for a strike on Iran's nuclear facilities.

Of course, none of this contradicts the possibility of taking covert action to hamper the Iranians' programme and supply routes. When the IAF destroyed the Osirak reactor in Baghdad in 1981, the "Begin doctrine" came into being, which holds that Israel will not let any hostile country in the region acquire nuclear weapons. The problem is that what could be accomplished in Iraq more than two decades ago is no longer possible today under the present circumstances in Iran.

The continual harping on the Iranian threat stems from domestic Israeli politics and a desire to increase investment in the security realm, but the ramifications of this are dangerous when you analyse expected developments in Iran's ballistics: It is impossible for Israel to ignore Iran's capacity to hit it, and Jerusalem must shape a policy that will neutralise that threat.

In another year, or three years from now, when the Iranians possess nuclear weapons, the rules of the strategic game in the region will be completely altered. Israel must reach that moment with a fully formulated and clear policy in hand, enabling it to successfully confront a potential nuclear threat, even when it is likely that the other side has no intention of carrying it out. The key, of course, is deterrence. Only a clear and credible signal to the Iranians, indicating the terrible price they will pay for attempting a nuclear strike against Israel, will prevent them from using their missiles. The Iranians have no logical reason to bring about the total destruction of their big cities, as could happen if Israel uses the means of deterrence at its disposal. Neither the satisfaction of killing Zionist infidels, nor, certainly, the promotion of Palestinian interests would justify that price. Israeli deterrence in the face of an Iranian nuclear threat has a good chance of succeeding precisely because the Iranians have no incentive to deal a mortal blow to Israel.

Therefore, all the declarations about developing the operational capability of IAF aircrafts should be there, so they can attack the nuclear facilities in Iran, and the empty promises about the ability of the Arrow missile defense system to contend effectively with the Shahab-3, not only do not help bolster Israel's power of deterrence, but actually undermine the process of building it and making it credible in Iranian eyes. The time has come to adopt new ways of thinking. No more fiery declarations and empty threats, but rather a carefully weighed policy grounded in sound strategy. Ultimately, in an era of a multi-nuclear Middle East, all sides will have a clear interest to lower tension and not to increase it.